Sales and Secured Transactions by Boshkoff, Douglass
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1961
Sales and Secured Transactions
Douglass Boshkoff
Indiana University Maurer School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Secured Transactions Commons, and the State and
Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Boshkoff, Douglass, "Sales and Secured Transactions" (1961). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 1059.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1059
SALES AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS
DOUGLASS G. BOSHKOFFt
TH ERE was little activity by the Michigan Supreme Court in this
area during the current Survey period. Only one case, in the
field of sales, merits textual treatment.
Richardson v. Messina= raised the question of whether a seller
might effectively disclaim liability for breach of an implied warranty
of fitness for a special purpose through the use of the following
language in the agreement between the parties:
... There are no understandings, agreements, representations or
warranties, express or implied, not specified herein, respecting this con-
tract or the property above mentioned .... 2
The quoted language refers both to express and implied war-
ranties. The former are derived from affirmations by a seller, relat-
ing to his product, which induce reliance by the purchaser.3 Implied
warranties are legal obligations, not necessarily resting upon affirma-
tions of fact but imposed by operation of law for the buyer's protec-
tion and based upon the nature of the transaction. Thus, in most
sales there is an implied warranty that the goods are of merchantable
quality.' If the Buyer has made known to the seller his special needs
and has relied upon the seller's skill and judgment in his selection of
the article then there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
fit for a special purpose.' The nature and extent of these implied
warranties are spelled out in the Uniform Sales Act, adopted by this
State in 1915.6
It is reasonable to expect that in certain situations the seller
will not want to run the risk of implied warranty liability. An ex-
press warranty may have the effect of protecting him by negating
any inconsistent implied warranties.' But more important, the Uniform
Sales Act recognizes elimination of implied warranty liability by
t Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University; Member of the Michigan
and New York Bars.
1. 361 Mich. 364, 105 N.W.2d 153 (1960).
2. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.
3. Uniform Sales Act § 12, Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.12 (1948), Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 19.252 (1959).
4. Uniform Sales Act § 15(2), Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.15(2) (1948), Mich.
Stat. Ann. § 19.252 (1959).
5. Uniform Sales Act § 15(1), Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.15(1) (1948), Mich.
Stat. Ann. § 19.252(1) (1959).
6. Notes 4 & 5 supra.
7. Uniform Sales Act § 15(6), Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.15(6), Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 19.255 (1959).
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agreement, 8 thus giving at least prima facie validity to exculpatory
language like that involved in the Richardson case. However, the
provision in the Sales Act, as administered by the courts, has been
limited in operation. Disclaimers have been ignored on the ground
that there was no mutual assent to the clause. The doctrine of strictly
construing a document against its draftsman has been invoked, and
recently a disclaimer was branded as unconscionable and unenforce-
able.' There are several cases on the question in Michigan. Unfortu-
nately, the path followed by the Michigan Supreme Court has not
always been clear.
The first decision on the subject appears to be Little v. G. E.
Van Sykcle & Co.10 decided in 1898, prior to passage of the Sales
Act. Buyer had purchased a piano which turned out to be in poor
condition and he claimed breach of an implied warranty of fitness
for a special purpose. Although the Sales Act was not yet even
drafted, such a warranty had already secured judicial recognition.
Seller's objection to introduction of testimony on the implied warranty
issue was based upon a contractual disclaimer.
"I also certify that I fully understand the terms of this contract,
and that there is no agreement or understanding between the sales-
man and myself otherwise than herein mentioned."" In a quotation
from Justice Moore's opinion we are told:
... If a vendor in such cases desires to avoid that warranty which
the law implies, he must incorporate it in his contract, or insert therein
a warranty which will exclude all others. Where a parol express warranty
has been agreed upon outside the written contract, and that contract
is such as the law implies without any agreement, the vendee cannot be
deprived of the benefit of this warranty by a provision in the contract
that "there is no agreement or understanding between the salesman and
myself otherwise than herein mentioned." Such a clause is not in con-
flict with the implied warranty which the law attaches to all such
contracts.'
2
The first sentence apparently states a position, untenable even in
1898,' 3 that you must give some type of express warranty to negate
implied warranties. In any event, it seems clear that passage of
8. Uniform Sales Act § 71, Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.71 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 19.311 (1959).
9. Prosser, the Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 Yale L. J. 1099, 1131-1133 (1960); Vold, Sales, 444-447 (2nd ed., 1959).
10. 115 Mich. 480, 73 N.V. 554 (1898).
11. 115 Mich. at 482, 73 N.V. at 554 (1898).
12. 115 Mich. at 483-84, 73 N.V. at 555 (1898).
13. Cf. Alaska Pacific Salmon Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 163 F.2d 643 at 656
fn. 8 (2d. Cir., 1947).
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the Uniform Sales Act in 1915 meant that a disclaimer alone could
do the job 4
The next case presenting the issue of validity of such a clause in
an implied warranty context was Youngs v. Advance-Runely Thresh-
ing Company,15 decided in 1921. The contract contained an express
warranty and a disclaimer:
There are no representations, warranties or condition express or
implied, statutory or otherwise, except those herein contained and no
agreement collateral hereto shall be binding upon either party unless
in writing hereupon or attached hereto, signed by the purchaser and
accepted by the vendor at its head office.16
This time the language was judged sufficient to prevent a claim of
implied warranty. The Sales Act was not cited and no mention was
made of the Little case. The Court relied upon analagous but not
controlling Michigan authorty.17
Ten years later, Volume 255 of the Michigan Reports produced
two cases of interest. The first was Kolodzcak v. Peerless Motor
Co., 8 decided on June 3, 1931, in which the contract provided:
"There are no understandings, agreements or warranties, expressed
or implied, not specified herein, respecting this contract or the goods
hereby ordered."' 9
The Court was of the opinion that the words were "plain and
emphatic" and there could be "no implied warranty of any kind
read into the contract."20 But three weeks later, in Lutz v. Hill-
Diesel Engine Co.,2 nothing "plain and emphatic" was found in
the following language: "It is expressly agreed and hereby acknowl-
edged that this contract constitutes the only agreement between the
parties thereof and that no other verbal contracts or agreements
exist between said parties."22
Nothing was said about the three week old decision in
Kolodzcak. The court regarded the clause as inoperative in regard
to implied warranties. The Youngs case was alluded to as an example
of effective language but the court proceeded apparently to apply
14. Uniform Sales Act § 71, Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.71 (1948), Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 19.311 (1959).
15. 215 Mich. 682, 184 N.W. 525 (1921).
16. 215 Mich. at 685, 184 N.W. at 536 (1921).
17. Bates Tractor Co. v. Gregory, 199 Mich. 8, 165 N.W. 612 (1917). (Buyer
relied on fraud and not on breach of warranty).
18. 255 Mich. 47, 237 N.W. 41 (1931).
19. 255 Mich. at 48, 237 N.W. at 41 (1931).
20. 255 Mich. at 49, 237 N.W. at 41 (1931).
21. 255 Mich. 98, 237 N.W. 546 (1931).
22. 255 Mich. at 101, 237 N.W. at 547 (1931).
[Vol. 8
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the doctrine of strict construction and did not find that implied
warranties were within the phrase "agreements or understandings."
At this point the post Sales Act score was 2-1 in favor of dis-
claimers and it could have been observed that the two effective dis-
claimers had specifically referred to implied warranties. Thus
although Kolodzcak was ignored by Justice Clarke in Lutz, a sensible
distinction could have been drawn between the cases.
The next decision came 20 years later in Wade v. Chariot Trailer
Co. 3 Here an order for a trailer stated: "It is further agreed that
there are no understandings, agreements or representations, express
or implied, not specified herein respecting this order and terms men-
tioned, and this instrument contains the entire agreement between
the parties, and is binding on both parties." 4
The language here seems to fall between Lutz and Kolodzcak in
excluding implied warranties. Reference to "implied" gives a warn-
ing as to the scope of exclusion attempted but the absence of "war-
ranty" arguably makes the intent less clear than in Kolodzcak. The
Court held that the quoted language did not prevent the purchaser
from relying on an implied warranty of merchantability. Lutz is cited
for the principle of strict construction and Kolodzcak was distin-
guished on its facts because of the presence there of an express war-
ranty in addition to the disclaimer. This factual distinction is not
significant but the opinion can be read as a confirmation of the
Court's intention to disregard disclaimers when confronted with any-
thing but the most clear and explicit language.
Having examined all the relevant Michigan decisions, we can
now return to Richardson. Looking at the language of the disclaimer
it would appear that any implied warranty would be excluded as it
bears a great similarity to that in Kolodzcak. But the result is
exactly opposite to that. Neither the Sales Act nor any cases decided
since its enactment are cited. Reliance is placed upon the 1898
decision in Little, and the out-dated language of Justice Moore, al-
23. 331 Mich. 576, 50 N.,V.2d 162 (1951).
24. 331 Mich. 579, 50 N.W.2d at 164 (1951). The conditional sales contract
also contained a disclaimer but it is not here considered since the one quoted was more
favorable to the seller's position.
25. It might be argued that the presence of an express 90 day warranty in
Kolodzcak made the disclaimer more palatable. But the protection given by the
warranty was illusory since it reserved to the seller the right to determine whether
there was a breach of the warranty. See 255 Mich. 48, 237 N.W.2d at 41 (1931).
For a discussion of the illusory nature of this type of warranty see Henningson v.
Bloomfield Motors, 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Noted 74 Harv. L. Rev. 630
(1960), 7 Wayne L. Rev. 382 (1960). Thus, distinguishing Kolodzcak from Vade on
this basis is a play upon facts having no legal significance. Either Wade overrules
Kolodzcak or there is another line of harmonization as suggested in the text.
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ready noted, is quoted in support of the result. In fairness to the
court, it should be pointed out that only Little was cited in the briefs.
In addition, there exists a basis on which to disregard the war-
ranty without inquiring into the basic validity of such a clause. The
contract provided that a condition precedent to liability was proper
functioning of the goods sold. Since the goods did not function it
would seem that the testimony on the failure to function could be
considered without reference to implied warranty or disclaimer.
Nevertheless, the court did not adopt this approach but, after plac-
ing heavy reliance on Little, remarked:
Our conclusions in this respect, we might add, are fortified by
certain provisions of the instruments before us . . . [referring to the
condition precedent]. As the trial court correctly observed with respect
to this language, it clearly meant that "the purchasers intended that all
of the equipment would operate properly before payments were to
become due." 26
No complaint is advanced concerning the result which was
certainly fair. On the other hand, as warranty liability is rapidly
being extended and developed,2 7 sellers of chattels can be expected to
place ever increasing reliance on disclaimers. Given the previous
relevant decisions in this jurisdiction, it would have been helpful to
have had a current statement of the Court's position on disclaimers.
It is hard to believe that the Court means to resurrect Little.
In conclusion, attention is called to section 5833 of the recently
passed revised judicature act, which provides that the statute of
limitations on actions for breach of warranty of quality or fitness be-
gins to run when the defect is discovered or should reasonably have
been discovered.
26. 361 Mich. at 368, 105 N.W.2d at 155.
